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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Appellee/Cross-Appellant Lisa Papotto (“Appellee”) is 
a widow seeking payment of benefits from Appellant/Cross-
Appellee Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. 
(“Appellant” or “Hartford”) under an accidental death and 
dismemberment policy in relation to her husband’s death.  
The policy at issue explicitly excludes losses “sustained while 
Intoxicated.”  Hartford’s Plan Administrator denied payment 
of benefits to Appellee because the deceased had consumed 
alcohol prior to his death.  On appeal, the District Court 
concluded that the policy implicitly required causal 
connection between intoxication and the loss, and remanded 
the case to the Plan Administrator.   Both parties posit that we 
have appellate jurisdiction to hear an appeal from this remand 
order.  Because we conclude that the remand order is not 
immediately appealable as a final judgment and that the 
collateral order doctrine does not apply, we dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
 
 The underlying facts in this case are tragic and largely 
undisputed.  On August 7, 2009, Frank Papotto, Jr. (“Mr. 
Papotto”), late husband of Appellee, was playing golf with 
several co-workers in New Jersey.  That afternoon, he drank 
approximately four to five beers.  At some point during the 
round, Mr. Papotto dropped his cell phone and fell out of a 
golf cart while reaching for it.  As a result of the fall, Mr. 
Papotto suffered a head injury and died approximately five 
hours later.  
 A toxicology screen conducted posthumously revealed 
that Mr. Papotto had a blood-alcohol level (“BAL”) of 0.115 
%.  The New Jersey state standard for intoxication is 0.08, 
putting Mr. Papotto’s BAL over the legal limit for operating a 
motor vehicle.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50 (2012).  
 At the time of his death, Mr. Papotto was an employee 
of TD Bank.  As an employee, Mr. Papotto was entitled to 
benefits under TD Bank’s welfare benefit plan which 
provided, among other things, accidental death and 
dismemberment insurance coverage (“AD&D”).  This AD&D 
policy (“the Policy”) was purchased through Hartford.  Mr. 
Papotto designated Appellee the beneficiary under the Policy. 
 The Policy provides Hartford with “full discretion and 
authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe 
and interpret all terms and provisions of [t]he Policy.”  (JA 
129.)  Under the terms of the Policy, benefits are payable 
when Mr. Papotto “sustain[s] an Injury that results in [a loss 
— dismemberment or death —] within 365 days of the date 
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of accident.”  (JA 124.)  The Policy states that losses caused 
or contributed to by an “Injury sustained while Intoxicated” 
are excluded.  (JA 127.)  The Policy defines “Intoxicated” as 
when the insured’s “blood alcohol content” or “the results of 
other means of testing blood alcohol level . . . meet or exceed 
the legal presumption of intoxication, or under the influence, 
under the law of the state where the accident occurred.”  (JA 
127.)  Appellant contends that this provision is a “status-
based exclusion,” whereby coverage is denied simply by the 
status of the insured, and does not include any element of 
causation.  (Appellant Br. 6.) 
B. Procedural History 
 
 On August 18, 2009, Appellee filed a claim with 
Hartford for the AD&D benefits.  On October 26, 2009, 
Hartford denied the claim because the evidence showed that 
Mr. Papotto was intoxicated at the time of his death.  On 
December 21, 2009, Appellee appealed Hartford’s denial to 
the Plan Administrator.  Appellee argued that: (1) Hartford 
could not rely on the results of the toxicology screen to prove 
that Mr. Papotto was intoxicated at the time of death (but 
offered no evidence to show the results of the screen were 
inaccurate or unreliable); (2) Hartford could not apply the 
New Jersey standard for intoxication because Mr. Papotto 
was not operating a motor vehicle at the time of his death; 
and (3) the Policy’s intoxication exclusion must be read to 
require a causal connection between the intoxication and the 
loss in order to bar coverage.  On January 19, 2010, the Plan 
Administrator upheld Hartford’s decision to deny the AD&D 
benefits.   
 On September 15, 2010, Appellee filed a complaint 
against Hartford in the District Court for the District of New 
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Jersey pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), challenging the Plan Administrator’s 
findings and renewing the three arguments that she raised in 
her appeal to the Administrator.  Both parties brought 
motions for summary judgment.   
  The District Court rejected Appellee’s first argument 
and found that it was generally reasonable for an 
administrator to rely on a toxicology report to establish 
evidence of intoxication.  The District Court also rejected 
Appellee’s second argument and found that it was reasonable 
for Hartford to rely on the New Jersey statute defining 
intoxication.   Thus, the District Court noted that the only 
remaining issue in dispute was “the propriety of [Hartford’s] 
construction of the Policy.”  Papotto v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., No. 10-4722, 2011 WL 6939331, at *1 
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011).  The District Court agreed with 
Appellee as to this issue, and found that Hartford’s 
interpretation of the policy was unreasonable.
1
  The District 
Court concluded that the intoxication exclusion provision 
must be read to bar coverage only when intoxication caused 
or contributed to the loss or death.  
 The District Court thus denied both summary 
judgment motions as premature, and remanded the case back 
to the Plan Administrator for consideration of whether Mr. 
Papotto’s intoxication caused or contributed to his death.  Id.  
In its order, the District Court also permitted the Plan 
Administrator to re-open the record and consider additional 
                                                 
1
 The District Court noted that it made this finding in light of 
Hartford’s inherent conflict of interest as administrator and 
payor of claims.   
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evidence to determine causation.  The District Court did not 
enter judgment in favor of any party.  A docket entry from 
January 6, 2012 reads “***Civil Case Terminated. (Per 
Chambers) . . . .”  (JA 26.) 
 Hartford timely appealed the District Court’s 
determination that the intoxication exclusion provision only 
precludes payment when the intoxication caused or 
contributed to the death.  Papotto cross-appealed, claiming 
that the District Court erred by permitting the Plan 
Administrator to re-open the record and consider new 
evidence.   
 After the filing of the notice of appeal, we sua sponte 
raised a question about our appellate jurisdiction.  The parties 
submitted briefing on this issue, asserting that we have 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s remand order pursuant to 
the collateral order doctrine. 
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 Before we inquire into the merits of the issues on 
appeal, we must address the question of our appellate 
jurisdiction.
2
  See Elliot v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 
213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Our jurisdictional inquiry must 
precede any discussion of the merits of the case for if a court 
lacks jurisdiction and opines on a case over which it has no 
authority, it goes ‘beyond the bounds of authorized judicial 
action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation 
of powers.’” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
                                                 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
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523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998))).  Both parties have indicated their 
consent to our appellate jurisdiction, but “it is well 
established that we have an independent duty to satisfy 
ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction regardless of the 
parties’ positions.”  Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, 
190 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997) (“[E]very 
federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself 
. . . of its own jurisdiction . . . , even though the parties are 
prepared to concede it.” (first alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In Re Resorts Int’l Inc., 372 F.3d 
154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot 
be conferred by consent of the parties.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
 Our authority to determine the extent of our own 
jurisdiction is plenary.  United States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 
196, 200 (3d Cir. 1999).  “[I]f we determine that we do not 
have jurisdiction over this appeal, our ‘only function 
remaining [will be] that of announcing the fact and dismissing 
the case.’”  Elliott, 682 F.3d at 219 (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94). 
 Federal appellate courts have jurisdiction 
predominantly over appeals from “final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Thus, 
in accordance with § 1291, “[w]e have jurisdiction to review 
only those orders of the district courts that are considered 
‘final.’”  ADAPT of Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 
390, 394 (3d Cir. 2005).  A final decision is one that “‘ends 
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment.’”  Harris v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root Servs., Inc., 618 F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).  Thus, 
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unless a statute specifically grants otherwise, appellate 
jurisdiction is dependent on whether the district court’s 
decision may be properly characterized as “final,” rendering it 
subject to appeal.  We refer to § 1291’s restriction on 
appellate jurisdiction as the finality rule.  See, e.g., Giles v. 
Campbell, 698 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 The finality rule is not inflexible, however.  The 
Supreme Court of the United States, recognizing that there 
are some issues that are “too important to be denied review 
and too independent of the cause itself to require that 
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is 
adjudicated,” created the collateral order doctrine.  Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  To 
fall within the “‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the 
final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively 
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).   
A. Finality Under § 1291 
 
 Although both parties contend that we should examine 
our jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, our first 
inquiry is always whether an order is “final” under § 1291.  
Whether a remand to an ERISA plan administrator is a final 
decision and qualifies for review pursuant to § 1291 is a 
matter of first impression for this Court.  Many of our sister 
courts have found remands to ERISA plan administrators 
analogous to remands to administrative agencies and have 
drawn from this jurisprudence to address questions of finality 
in the ERISA context.  See, e.g., Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., 
Inc., 238 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001); Petralia v. AT&T 
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Global Info. Solutions Co., 114 F.3d 352, 354 (1st Cir. 1997).  
We follow suit and begin by exploring our jurisprudence on 
appellate jurisdiction over remands to administrative 
agencies. 
1. Remands to Administrative Agencies 
 
 “The general principle enunciated by this [C]ourt is 
that district court orders remanding cases to administrative 
agencies are not final and appealable.”  Bhd. of Maint. Way 
Emps. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 
1988) [hereinafter Brotherhood].  We have determined, 
however, that a remand to an administrative agency may be 
deemed final for purposes of § 1291 “when a [d]istrict [c]ourt 
finally resolves an important legal issue in reviewing an 
administrative agency action and denial of appellate review 
before remand to the agency would foreclose appellate review 
as a practical matter.”  Kreider, 190 F.3d at 118.  We distill a 
three-pronged standard from this statement in Kreider; 
accordingly, we may exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to the finality rule over remands to administrative agencies 
when: (1) the remand “finally resolves” an issue, (2) the legal 
issue is “important,” and (3) denial of immediate review will 
“foreclose appellate review” in the future.3  Notably, in 
grappling with our jurisdiction over remands, we have 
                                                 
3
 Creating a test to ascertain our jurisdiction over remands is 
not novel.  See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (laying out our four-factor test to evaluate whether 
district court remands to bankruptcy court are final under 
§ 1291).   
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consistently accorded significant weight to the third factor — 
i.e., potential for evasion of future review.  See AJA Assocs. v. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 817 F.2d 1070, 1073 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(finding jurisdiction over a remand requiring the 
administrative agency to provide a procedural due process 
hearing because the district court’s decision granting 
applicants the right to a hearing could not receive later 
appellate review); United Steelworkers of Am. Local 1913 v. 
Union R.R. Co., 648 F.2d 905, 910 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding 
jurisdiction over a remand order that required a reconstituted 
administrative board to conduct an entirely new hearing 
because the remand order essentially disposed of all previous 
findings and orders and any new determinations would likely 
be unreviewable).   
 To be clear, we do not engage in this analysis to 
determine if there is an exception to the finality rule; courts of 
appeals do not have authority to create exceptions to 
congressional limits on jurisdiction.  See Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2010) (“Congress . . . determine[s] 
the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction.”); Kreider, 190 
F.3d at 122-26 (“[T]he judiciary has no power to make 
exceptions to the congressional determinations [of appellate 
jurisdiction].”) (Sloviter, J., concurring).  Contra id. at 120 
(referring to the three-pronged standard as an “exception to 
finality in agency proceedings”).  Rather, this analysis reflects 
a “practical construction of finality.”  Id. at 125 (Sloviter, J., 
concurring); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 
U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (“This Court . . . has long given § 1291 
a practical rather than a technical construction.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262 
(referring to the analysis of remands under § 1291 as the 
“practical finality rule”); Petralia, 114 F.3d at 354 (referring 
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to the analysis of remands as a “corollary rule” to the finality 
rule).
4
  Therefore, we utilize the Kreider test merely to 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, even the 
collateral order doctrine is “best understood not as an 
exception to the final decision rule laid down by Congress in 
§ 1291, but as a practical construction of it.”  Will v. Hallock, 
546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We recognize that our jurisprudence on this issue has not 
always been consistent.  Compare, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 705 
F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) (referring to the collateral order 
doctrine as an “exception[] to the general rule of finality 
under § 1291”), with Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 
136 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the collateral order 
doctrine is not an exception, but a practical construction of 
the finality rule).  Given the Supreme Court’s recent move 
away from the term “exception,” compare Richardson-
Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (discussing 
the “‘collateral order exception’ to the final judgment rule”), 
with Hallock, 546 U.S. at 349, we decline to use this term 
(“exception”) when referring to either the collateral order 
doctrine or the Kreider test.  Because our Constitution 
establishes that Congress alone sets the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the federal courts, Hertz, 559 U.S. at 84; Kline 
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 233-34 (1922), “there can 
be no judicially created ‘exception’” to these boundaries, 
Kreider, 190 F.3d at 122 (Sloviter, J., concurring).  At times, 
Congress has expanded our appellate jurisdiction by statute.  
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); 28 
U.S.C. § 1452.  But the Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
these Congressional statutory grants “by no means suggest[] 
that [the courts] should now be more ready to make similar 
judgments [on jurisdiction] for themselves.”  Digital Equip. 
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evaluate whether a specific decision of the district court — 
incorporated within a remand order — is indeed “final” for 
purposes of § 1291.  See Harris, 618 F.3d at 400 (“‘[T]here 
are instances in which a final decision is not a final 
judgment.’” (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 
658 (1977))). 
 Kreider aptly exemplifies our application of the three-
pronged test.  In Kreider, a farmer (“Kreider”) applied to the 
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) for an 
exemption to avoid paying certain fees related to his dairy 
farm.  190 F.3d at 116.  Kreider’s application was denied by 
the market administrator.  The decision was reversed by the 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was in turn reversed 
by the judicial officer (“JO”).  Kreider filed a complaint in 
district court, which remanded the case for further evidentiary 
findings (“first order”).  On remand, the ALJ denied Kreider 
exemption status once again, and Kreider appealed.  The JO 
                                                                                                             
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 880 n.7 (1994).  
We thus believe that the better interpretation of both the 
Kreider test and the collateral order doctrine is that they are 
tools to be used by courts in faithfully interpreting the finality 
requirement of § 1291. 
We also note that this view is consistent with our precedent 
on remands to bankruptcy courts.  See Owens, 419 F.3d at 
203 (noting that the four-factor test for remands to bankruptcy 
court is merely an application of “a broader concept of 
finality”); Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the four-factor test reflects “a relaxed 
standard of finality”).   
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determined the appeal was untimely because it was mailed on 
the date the appeal was due via Federal Express.  Although 
the applicable regulation required that an appeal is deemed to 
be filed when it is postmarked, the JO determined here that 
the term “postmarked” required a United States Postal 
Service postmark, rather than the mark of Federal Express.  
Id. at 117.  Kreider returned to district court.  Upon review, 
the district court found that Kreider’s appeal was timely and 
thus remanded for consideration on the merits (“second 
order”). 
 The USDA appealed to us, arguing that the district 
court erred in finding Kreider’s appeal timely.  On appeal, we 
sua sponte raised the question of our jurisdiction.  We found 
no jurisdiction over the first order for consideration of 
additional evidence because the first order “[did] not finally 
resolve a particularly important legal issue, and, more 
importantly, it [was] not an order that [would] evade appellate 
review.”  Id. at 120.   
 By contrast, recognizing that questions regarding the 
timeliness of an appeal directly implicated disputes over the 
district court’s jurisdiction, we found jurisdiction over the 
second order.  We noted that the second order,  
resolves an issue of law that may evade review 
if immediate appeal is not  permitted; should 
Kreider receive the relief it seeks on remand, it 
is doubtful that the USDA would be able to 
appeal its own decision in order to raise the 
procedural issues decided by the District Court.   
Id.   
15 
 
2. Application 
 
 We believe this test, applying a practical construction 
of finality, is equally applicable in the ERISA context.  As 
jurisdictional questions under § 1291 “should be made on a 
case-by-case basis,” Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1263, we apply this 
rule in light of the particular facts before us, bearing in mind 
our jurisprudence discussed above.   
 The remand order at issue here directed the Plan 
Administrator to take two actions: (1) to consider additional 
evidence, and (2) to read a causation requirement into the 
intoxication exclusion provision and determine whether Mr. 
Papotto’s intoxication caused or contributed to his death.  In 
looking only to the order for consideration of more evidence, 
we easily determine that we lack appellate jurisdiction over 
this portion of the remand.  As we have previously 
determined, “orders directing remands to [administrative 
agencies] to consider additional evidence [are] nonfinal.”  
Brotherhood, 864 F.2d at 285.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (holding that a remand order to the railroad board for 
consideration of more evidence relating to the termination of 
employees was not final and appealable).   
 Moreover, this portion of the remand order fails the 
first of the Kreider prongs — it does not “finally resolve” 
anything.  We take guidance from a recent Fourth Circuit 
case, which squarely addressed the same issue and held that a 
remand order to an ERISA administrator for consideration of 
more evidence was not final for purposes of § 1291 because it 
resolved a purely procedural issue and did not address the 
merits of the claim.  Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 
228, 231-32 (4th Cir. 2012).   In the same vein, we now hold 
that the first portion of the remand order requiring the 
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consideration of more evidence involves a strictly procedural 
matter.  There is no final resolution on the merits, the first of 
the Kreider prongs is not met, and appellate jurisdiction does 
not exist.
5
    
 The second portion of the remand order — directing 
the Plan Administrator to read a causation requirement into 
the intoxication exclusion provision and determine whether 
Mr. Papotto’s intoxication caused or contributed to his death 
— is a more complicated matter.   
a. “Finally Resolves” 
 
 We first ask whether the remand order of the District 
Court “finally resolves” the underlying issue of this case.  See 
Kreider, 190 F.3d at 120.  Other circuits have examined this 
prong by asking a simple question:  Does the remand order 
make an ultimate determination as to eligibility, thus leaving 
                                                 
5
 Appellee argues that if we find jurisdiction over the remand 
order regarding the intoxication exclusion provision, then the 
portion of the remand order mandating consideration of more 
evidence should be joined for judicial economy.  We can find 
no support for this proposition.  Moreover, this suggestion 
seems to run contrary to the Supreme Court’s caution that 
judicial economy counsels against extending appellate 
jurisdiction.  Accord Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 106-07 
(recognizing that final-judgment rule prevents “piecemeal, 
prejudgment appeals” that would “undermine[] efficient 
judicial administration” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
However, because we will determine that we lack jurisdiction 
over the remaining portion of the remand order, we need not 
decide this issue. 
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the plan administrator with nothing left to do but issue an 
order?  See Gerhardt v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 574 
F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a final order is 
one that “leaves nothing for the [lower] court to do but 
execute the judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262 (finding remands final when the 
district court “essentially instructs the agency to rule in favor 
of the [one party]”).  
 The Tenth Circuit addressed this very question in 
Spradley v. Owens-Illinois Hourly Employees Welfare Benefit 
Plan.  686 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 2012).  In that case, 
an employee filed suit following the denial of his benefits 
under a permanent and total disability life insurance plan.  
The district court reversed, finding that the employee was 
entitled to benefits under the unambiguous language of the 
Plan and remanded the case to the administrator for further 
proceedings in light of the determination on eligibility.  Id. at 
1139.  The Tenth Circuit held that when the district court 
essentially instructs the administrator to rule in favor of the 
plaintiff, the remand order is final and appellate jurisdiction is 
appropriate.  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit observed,  
[i]n this case, the district court held that 
Plaintiff was eligible for benefits under the 
plain language of the Plan, and the court’s order 
left no room for the Plan administrator to 
question this holding on remand.  Further, 
[because] the terms of the Plan clearly define 
how much of a benefit an eligible employee in 
Plaintiff’s position should receive . . . , the 
district court’s order essentially left the Plan 
administrator with nothing to do on remand but 
award the requested benefits, a ministerial task 
18 
 
involving no discretion on the Plan 
administrator’s part. 
Id. at 1140. 
 The remand order here, unlike the one in Spradley, 
requires further action by the Plan Administrator.  Rather than 
leaving it with “nothing to do,” the remand order instructs the 
Plan Administrator to consider additional evidence and 
engage in a fact-finding process to determine whether Mr. 
Papotto’s intoxication caused or contributed to his death.  The 
determination of eligibility, therefore, has not been “finally 
resolved.”6 
                                                 
6
 Appellant contends that we should not view the “finally 
resolved” prong so stringently and that we should exercise 
jurisdiction, not only when the remand order determines 
eligibility, but also when its ruling significantly affects 
eligibility — such as here where the District Court has 
compelled the Plan Administrator to construe the plan in a 
particular fashion.  (See Appellant Br. 19.)  In support, 
Appellant urges us to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Hensley v. Northwest Permanente P.C. Retirement Plan & 
Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 
grounds by Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins., 458 F.3d 955 
(9th Cir. 2006).  In Hensley, nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants were denied benefits under pension plans because 
the plan administrator determined that they were not 
“employees” under the W-2 definition, and thus were 
ineligible.  The nurse practitioners and physician assistants 
filed suit in district court.  The district court remanded the 
case to the plan administrator for a new determination as to 
the plaintiffs’ eligibility for benefits under the common law 
19 
 
b. Foreclosure of Future Appellate Review 
 
 We next examine the third Kreider prong,
7
 i.e., 
whether the denial of immediate review will “foreclose 
appellate review as a practical matter.”  See Kreider, 190 F.3d 
at 118, 120.  Appellant insists that, if we do not entertain the 
                                                                                                             
definition of “employee.”  Upon review, the Ninth Circuit 
found that it had jurisdiction under § 1291 because it was an 
appeal from a decision “directly implicating fundamental 
eligibility decisions under the Plan.”  Id. at 993.  Although we 
accord respect to our sister court, we believe its decision in 
Hensley runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonition that 
finality precludes consideration of even a “fully consummated 
decision[]” if it is only a “step[] towards final judgment.”  
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
7
 We have no doubt that the second Kreider prong — 
importance — is met.  Courts have ruled on both sides of the 
question the District Court resolved here — whether 
causation must be read into an exclusion provision.  See, e.g., 
Rau v. Hartford Life & Accidental Ins. Co., No. 11-cv-01772, 
2013 WL 1985305, at *5 (D. Conn. May 13, 2013) 
(upholding the validity of a status-based intoxication 
exclusion); Bickel v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., No. 09-2735, 2010 
WL 3938348, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2010) (holding that 
“[a]dding a causation element to the exclusion would be an 
impermissible modification [of] the Plan”).   
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remand order at this current junction, it may elude us forever.  
Specifically, Appellant fears the following scenario:  On 
remand, the plan administrator examines the evidence and 
determines that intoxication did not contribute to Mr. 
Papotto’s death.  The Plan Administrator will then order 
payment of benefits to Appellee.  And because an insurance 
company has no vehicle under ERISA by which it may 
challenge its own decision, Appellant will be unable to return 
to our Court to challenge the District Court’s ruling and will 
be forced to pay benefits.
8
   
                                                 
8
 Appellant’s fear is not unwarranted.  Indeed, the Tenth 
Circuit has acknowledged this very possibility and has held 
that remand orders to ERISA plan administrators present 
unique finality problems: 
[I]n the administrative agency context, if 
nowhere else . . . agencies may be barred from 
seeking district court (and thus circuit court) 
review of their own administrative decisions.  
Consequently, if a district court remands an issue 
to an administrative agency and essentially 
instructs the agency to rule in favor of the 
plaintiff, the agency may well be foreclosed 
from again appealing the district court’s 
determination at any later stage of the 
proceeding.   
Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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 We agree that the Plan Administrator may decide in 
Appellee’s favor on remand.  We also agree that there is no 
provision in the ERISA statute permitting an insurance 
company to challenge the decision of its own plan 
administrator in district court.
9
  We disagree, however, that if 
these events transpire, Appellant will be left with no recourse 
to appeal the District Court’s ruling on causation.  As 
explained below, because we believe the District Court only 
“administratively closed” the case and has thus retained 
jurisdiction over the matter, Appellant will be able to return to 
District Court. 
 Retention of jurisdiction through the administrative 
closing of a case is an established practice in district courts 
within our Circuit.  Indeed, “[f]ederal courts have long 
distinguished dismissals from administrative closings.”  
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 246 
(3d Cir. 2013).  Dismissals end all proceedings, at which time 
the district court relinquishes any jurisdiction over the matter.  
See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 
(2000) (noting that the dismissal “plainly disposed of the 
entire case on the merits and left no part of it pending before 
the court”).  By contrast, administrative closings do not end 
the proceeding.  Rather, they are a practical tool used by 
courts to “prune . . . overgrown dockets” and are “particularly 
useful in circumstances in which a case, though not dead, is 
                                                 
9
 Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA only permits “a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary” to bring a civil suit seeking 
enforcement of an ERISA plan; it does not permit an 
insurance company to bring a direct challenge in federal court 
to challenge a plan administrator’s decision.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(3).   
22 
 
likely to remain moribund for an appreciable period of time.”  
Freeman, 709 F.3d at 247 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio, LLC, 166 F.3d 389, 
392 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Administrative closings comprise a 
familiar, albeit essentially ad hoc, way in which courts 
remove cases from their active files without making any final 
adjudication.”).  Most importantly, district courts retain 
jurisdiction over administratively closed cases.  This means 
that a court may reopen the case — either on its own or at the 
request of a party — at any time.  Freeman, 709 F.3d at 247. 
 In this case, it is clear that the District Court only 
administratively closed, and thus has retained jurisdiction 
over, the proceedings below.  On December 30, 2011, the 
order of the District Court remanding the case to the Plan 
Administrator for further evaluation was entered.  On January 
6, 2012, the clerk entered “***Civil Case Terminated” on the 
docket.  (JA 26.)  True, the District Court used the term 
“terminated.”  But we must focus on the substance of the 
order, not the label.  Significantly, the District Court never 
mentioned dismissal; moreover, the substance of the remand, 
requiring further fact-finding that may be reviewed at a later 
date, does not suggest permanence.  The District Court did 
not “disassociate itself from [the] case;” it merely put its 
involvement on hold.  Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 35, 42 (1995).  We therefore conclude that the District 
Court’s docket entry terminating the case was an 
administrative closing that has not deprived the District Court 
of jurisdiction and that either party may, at any time, move to 
re-open proceedings and seek our review. 
 We note that our analysis of the posture of the District 
Court proceedings is in harmony with that of our sister courts.  
The First Circuit, in adopting a synonymous view, explained,  
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[o]rdinarily implicit in a district court’s order of 
remand to a plan fiduciary is an understanding 
that after a new decision by the plan fiduciary, a 
party seeking judicial review in the district court 
may do so by a timely motion filed in the same 
civil action, and is not required to commence a 
new civil action.  To avoid any 
misunderstanding that might otherwise occur, we 
state that we interpret the order of the district 
court in this case as having retained jurisdiction, 
in this sense, to hear and decide any timely 
motion for judicial review filed after further 
proceedings before the plan fiduciary.  This is so 
regardless of whether the case is formally held 
open or instead administratively closed on the 
district court docket in the meantime. 
Petralia, 114 F.3d at 355; see also Young v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 671 F.3d 1213, 1214-16 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding 
that the district court retained jurisdiction despite the fact that 
it entered “[t]his case is closed” on its docket following a 
remand order to an ERISA plan administrator); Bowers v. 
Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 365 F.3d 535, 537 
(6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the district court’s remand order 
as retaining jurisdiction and permitting “either party to 
challenge the eligibility determination that the plan 
administrator renders on remand”); cf. Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 
1261-62 (assuming that the district court retained jurisdiction 
over the remand order where the district court expressly 
stated in its docket that the case file was “subject to a motion 
to re-open”).   
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3. Remand Order Is Not Final Under § 1291 
 
 We conclude that the District Court’s remand order 
directing the Plan Administrator to read causation into the 
intoxication provision is not final.  It has neither “finally 
resolved” the issue of eligibility, nor will it evade future 
appellate review.  See Kreider, 190 F.3d at 120.  As such, we 
must “resist[] the temptation to abandon the deeply held 
distaste for piecemeal litigation simply because we are 
presented with a case whose immediate resolution would 
clarify the law and terminate a drawn-out controversy.”  
Brotherhood, 864 F.2d at 286 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
B. Collateral Order Doctrine 
 
 Having decided that the remand order is not a final 
order under § 1291 because it is not a final resolution of 
eligibility and will not forever evade our review, we next turn 
to whether the collateral order doctrine vests us with 
jurisdiction.  Given our analysis above, the collateral order 
doctrine offers the parties no solace.  We may not hear this 
matter. 
 Under the three-pronged test of the collateral order 
doctrine, an interim decision is appealable if it: “(1) 
conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment.”  Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 
(2003) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Praxis Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 
947 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1991).  “The criteria are ‘stringent.’”  
N.J., Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Inv. v. Fuld, 604 F.3d 816, 
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819 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 
Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)).   
 In light of our discussion above, the first and third 
prongs of the collateral order doctrine are not satisfied.  As to 
the second prong, while the issue may be important, it is not 
separate or collateral.  The focus of the remand — i.e., how to 
determine eligibility — directly implicates the heart of this 
case — whether Mr. Papotto’s death is an eligible event for 
distribution of benefits.  Consequently, the interpretation of 
the intoxication clause “touches on the merits” of the benefits 
determination.  Cipollone v.  Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 
1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Cunningham v. Hamilton 
Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999) (noting that the separateness 
prong is only satisfied when the issue on appeal is 
“completely divorced” from the merits of a case); Dickens, 
677 F.3d at 233 (declining to find jurisdiction over a remand 
order under the collateral order doctrine where the district 
court instructed the plan administrator on the definition of 
eligibility but left for the plan administrator to conduct a fact-
finding analysis as to whether that definition was met).  
Because the remand order satisfies none of the three prongs, 
we find the collateral order doctrine inapplicable.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 The District Court’s remand order is not a final order 
under § 1291.  Nor is it appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine.  Therefore, we are bereft of jurisdiction and will 
dismiss this appeal. 
